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Introduction 
Estrangement is arguably one of the most important themes of our time. It has 
been linked to self-knowledge, autobiography, science fiction, Existentialism, 
historical consciousness, postmodernism, and postcolonial disorders, among 
other things.1 In relation to the work of Martin Heidegger, estrangement has 
been linked to language, truth and poetry,2 nihilism,3 and oppression.4 
However, there is relatively little research on the relation between 
estrangement and ‘fantasy’. Moreover, there are very few studies of 
Heidegger’s understanding of estrangement and its relevance to fantasy as a 
genre, just as there is relatively little research on the relevance of both to 
scientific-materialist discourses concerning being, nature, value, and meaning. 
It will be argued here that Heidegger’s work on estrangement, though 
questionable in some respects, is nevertheless important in relation to ‘fantasy’ 
and that ‘fantasy’, when understood in the context of this relation, allows one 
to articulate a critique of scientific-materialist discourses. 
For the purposes of this argument, ‘fantasy’ will be understood as a 
genre which is concerned with the fantastic, the extraordinary or the 
marvellous, or as Anne Swinfen would have it, with the dimension of the 
immaterial (that is, in the sense of ‘non-material’) and things that, in her 
words, “cannot exist in the world of empirical experience”.5 ‘Fantasy’, one 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2001); Peter A. Dorsey, Sacred Estrangement (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); E.G. Parrinder, Learning from Other Worlds 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000); David Cooper, Existentialism: A 
Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); Anthony Kemp, The Estrangement of the Past: 
A Study in the Origins of Modern Historical Consciousness (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991); Ian Gregson, Contemporary Poetry and Postmodernism: Dialogue and 
Estrangement (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Mary-Jo Del Vecchio Good (ed.), 
Postcolonial Disorders (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
2 Gerald L. Bruns, On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1989). 
3 Arthur Kroker, The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004). 
4 John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger’s Challenge to Western 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
5 Anne Swinfen, In Defence of Fantasy: A Study of the Genre in English and American 
Literature Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 5. 
Space, Time, Being, and Estrangement 
Literature & Aesthetics 19 (2) December 2009, page 42 
might say, explores the irrational but also the a-rational dimensions of being. It 
is notable that Swinfen links the genre to a broad critique of a world view 
governed by “materialism” and “rationalism”.6 ‘Scientific-materialist’ 
discourses will be understood in terms of an affirmation of ‘science’, in 
particular the affirmation of observation, the observable and theory formation, 
especially in the context of the physical or human sciences, as a means of 
explaining not just observed particulars but also ‘reality’ or ‘life’ (in some 
broad sense) as well as the universe, nature, being, purpose, value, and other 
such things. 
One of the most remarkable phenomena of our time – one might say, 
one of the most striking bifurcations in late twentieth-century and early twenty-
first-century thought and culture – is the recent upsurge of works of ‘fantasy’ 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, of broadly scientific-materialist 
discourses on theism, atheism, life, the universe, and so on. The fact that these 
two upsurges have been more or less contemporaneous is also quite notable. 
And numerous questions arise: to what extent are those discourses adequate to 
the task of explaining ‘life’, ‘reality’, the universe or being, and other such 
things? What is the connection between ‘science’ and the marvellous or the 
fantastic or even the non-material? What is the relationship between these two 
upsurges, if any? And what does the upsurge in ‘fantasy’ reveal about the 
question of the relation between us and the realm of the originary opened up by 
Heidegger, or indeed in relation to primordial things in general, or in relation to 
being, or “the call” to questioning or thinking.7 Of course, it is hardly possible 
to answer all of these questions here and now, but it is possible to begin to 
answer some of them. 
One need only think of the recent upsurge in interest in works of 
fantasy, on the one hand (for example, Peter Jackson’s interpretations of the 
Lord of the Rings and their global reception, the renewed global interest in the 
Narnia and Harry Potter narratives and films, and so on) and on the other hand, 
the upsurge of broadly scientific-materialist accounts of ‘life’, the universe, its 
origins, meaning, purpose and/or value, for example, in recent work by Richard 
Dawkins, Steven Weinberg, Michel Onfray, and numerous others. Dawkins, 
for example in The God Delusion, writes of biology and more broadly, of 
‘science’, as a privileged source of explanation in relation to an understanding 
of life as a whole, though it is not entirely clear what ‘life’ actually means in 
such contexts, or what the relationship is between the empirical study of 
particular living things in terms of material processes and ‘life’ as it applies to 
the universe as a whole.  
                                                             
6 Swinfen, In Defence of Fantasy, p. 2. 
7 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 242. 
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What is clear is that ‘science’ in such works is seen as the key to 
understanding ‘life’ or the universe, or at least, to the provision of a theory that 
will make ‘life’ as a whole or the universe intelligible. Similarly, Steven 
Weinberg believes that the more we learn about the universe through physical 
science in particular, the more pointless it seems to be!8 Once again, it is not 
clear in what sense the universe as a whole can be ‘pointless’ or otherwise in 
the light of inquiry into a very small number of its parts through physical 
science. Nor for that matter is it clear what he means by pointlessness: to say 
that something is pointless is to say a number of things, for example, that it 
lacks significance; that it lacks a purpose; that it lacks an end; that it lacks a 
meaningful goal; that it lacks a point (whatever that might mean); and so on. It 
is also not clear how this sense of an increasing awareness of ‘pointlessness’, if 
that is what he means, can be justified by the recent discoveries of modern 
physics. Indeed, given that much of the universe remains hidden from 
observation, or remains unobserved, Weinberg’s view could be seen as 
somewhat presumptuous. 
 
Tolkien’s “Secondary World” 
Tolkien’s work on the “Secondary World” is pertinent in this discussion not 
only of ‘science’ and ‘life’, but also of estrangement and ‘fantasy’. He believed 
that this “Secondary World” does not “destroy” or “insult” reason; it does not 
“either blunt the appetite for nor obscure the perception of scientific verity”.9 
He added: the “keener and the clearer is the reason, the better fantasy it will 
make. If men were ever in a state in which they did not want to know or could 
not perceive truth (facts or evidence) then Fantasy would languish till they 
were cured”.10 These are important points: ‘fantasy’, in this reading, is not 
necessarily devoid of clear reasons or even clear reasoning; some grasp of the 
truth, perhaps in the sense of how things are in the world, and some grasp of 
knowledge, for example about the natural world and its interconnections, are 
important if ‘fantasy’ is to appeal to us as truth-seekers or as knowledgeable 
readers, viewers and thinkers. He argued, however, that “creative fantasy” is 
not a “slave” to the “recognition of fact” but is founded upon it.11 He meant, 
presumably, that the ability to recognise fact underpins, or inspires, the 
emergence of a work of creative fantasy. It is not difficult to see the point: for 
example, many readers of the Harry Potter series can grasp the relationship 
between Harry’s (fictional) family and the fact of social inequality in England 
                                                             
8 Steven Weinberg, The First Three Minutes (London: Deutsch, 1977). 
9 J. R. R. Tolkien, Tree and Leaf (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 50. 
10 Tolkien, Tree and Leaf, p. 50. 
11 Tolkien, Tree and Leaf, p. 50. 
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(or elsewhere), just as they can see how actual social inequality can provide a 
meaningful foundation for an interpretation of Harry as a character who values 
and instantiates a kind of creative and symbolic freedom on a number of levels.  
Tolkien also wrote of ‘fantasy’ as an evangelium, in which one could 
grasp a kind of joy, “beyond the walls of the world”,12 “that for a moment 
passes outside the frame, rends indeed the very web of story, and lets a gleam 
comes through”.13 It is not that fantasy is devoid of fact, necessarily; rather that 
it resists the domination of “observed ‘fact’”, an important distinction that 
should not be forgotten.14 He believed that the genre provides “images of 
things… not to be found in our primary world at all or are generally believed 
not to be found there”.15 This point coheres well with Swinfen’s emphasis, 
mentioned earlier, on the immaterial. 
Clearly, Tolkien’s work in this context is important in light of the 
question of how things are, or how things stand, and in particular in relation to 
insightful works of ‘fantasy’ which are not devoid, necessarily, of facts or 
knowledge. Given that we do arguably have an upsurge now in works that 
seem to affirm the domination of observed fact or of knowledge based on 
observation, Tolkien’s work would seem to provide a thought-provoking 
counterpoint, and opens a path to a possible critique of scientific-materialist 
discourses and what they tell us about ‘life’, the world, the universe, cosmic 
purpose or pointlessness and so on, precisely because it highlights a 
domination that may itself be unjustified; a sense of things that may be quite 
real but which are not accessible to observation or intelligible within known 
laws of nature; a sense in which knowledge of some things may not be 
adequate to an understanding of the whole. 
 
Heidegger on ‘Truth’ 
Heidegger’s work is also significant in this respect, particularly in relation to 
his reflections on the ‘nature of things’. He wrote: for “a long time we have 
been accustomed to characterize [sic] the question of what something is as a 
question about its nature”.16 He seems to mean that ‘we’, working in the 
context of “Western philosophy” (especially ontology), have become used to a 
way of thinking according to which the key to understanding what something 
is, lies in grasping its ‘nature’. It is as if this way of thinking has become 
                                                             
12 Tolkien, Tree and Leaf, p. 60. 
13 Tolkien, Tree and Leaf, p. 61. 
14 Tolkien, Tree and Leaf, p. 61. 
15 Tolkien, Tree and Leaf, p. 44. 
16 Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy? (New Haven: College and University Press, 
1958), p. 43. 
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customary, one might say, or ingrained, or even unreflective. Heidegger saw 
this as a kind of estrangement from other fundamentally important ways of 
thinking that derive (also) from the ancient Greeks:  
[The] question about the nature of something awakens at those times 
when that, whose nature is being questioned, has become obscure 
and confused [verdunkelt und verwirrt], when at the same time the 
relationship of men to what is being questioned has become 
uncertain or has even been shattered” [erschüttert]”.17 
This is a rich passage that deserves close, detailed scrutiny but which is outside 
the immediate scope of this paper. However, what one can say here is this: 
according to Heidegger, to inquire into the ‘nature’ of something, while 
presupposing that that is the key to a true understanding of it, is a manifestation 
not of sound methodology but of confusion; what is confused, fundamentally, 
is the question of origin or ground on the one hand, and the question of the 
nature of something, on the other hand. What becomes obscured or confused is 
the question of the primordial relation of the thing to its ground; the search for 
the nature of something is a kind of manifestation of confusion and obscurity. 
In a sense, one is estranged from the question of the primordial relation, or of 
the ground, which is why the question of the nature of something ‘awakens’ 
again. 
More broadly, Heidegger argued that this kind of problem emerges 
when at the same time our relationship to things (whose nature is sought in 
questioning) has become uncertain or severed. In other words, Heidegger was 
pointing to a kind of estrangement on two levels: first, from what things really 
are (and questions about the nature of such things become the very 
manifestation of a state of confusion or obscurity); and second, from a 
relationship, perhaps primordial, between us and the things that ‘we’ ask such 
questions about, especially if, Heidegger added, the nature of a thing “might 
then define for ‘us’ the whole of the thing… or… might lead us to presuppose 
that its ‘essence’ lies in its nature”.18 Such a view amounts to a catastrophic 
error, according to Heidegger. 
Of the ‘essence’, he wrote: the “essence of man can never be proven 
scientifically… [that] what is essential always remains unprovable, or more 
precisely, lies outside the sphere of provability or unprovability”.19 Although 
his understanding of the ‘essence’ is not always clear, he believed it to be what 
endures in us. He offered another clue: he argued that the question of the 
                                                             
17 Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, p. 43, emphasis added. 
18 Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, p. 43. 
19 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus 
(London: Continuum, 2002), p. 56. 
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nature of something is often cast as a scientific one; but he asked why the 
nature of a human being should explain the essence of such a being. This is a 
good question. It does not follow, necessarily, that if one has explained the 
‘nature’ of something, that one has also explained its ‘essence’ (if the latter is 
defined as that which endures in us, for example); nor is it evident or obvious 
that the “nature” of something is identical to its ‘essence’. In this context, 
Heidegger would seem to be correct, especially if the ‘essence’ is, as he 
believed, outside the “sphere of provability or unprovability”.20 One might say 
(though Heidegger did not say this), that the ‘nature’ of something is often, if 
not always, cast as a ‘scientific’ question, that is to say a biological or physical 
question for example, and the ‘essence’ is often, if not always, cast as a trans-
physical question (rather than a metaphysical question, in this case, for 
Heidegger voiced well-known objections to aspects of ‘Western’ metaphysics 
and ontology). 
In any case, Heidegger went on to argue that “the essence of 
unhiddenness is deconcealment” [Entbergsamkeit];21 through it, in it, the 
unhiddenness of beings occurs. That is, unhiddenness is not achieved through 
questions about the ‘nature’ of something, but through the question of how 
being is deconcealed. This is of great importance in relation to ‘fantasy’: just 
as Being, in Heidegger’s words, “inclines intrinsically to self-concealment”,22 
one might say that ‘fantasy’ as a genre opens up the sphere of deconcealment, 
in which what is essential in us unfolds (for example, freedom, courage, 
epiphany, virtue, fellowship and love, and so on, in The Lord of the Rings). So, 
the essence is what endures in beings and is not reducible to their ‘nature’, and 
deconcealment is the revelation of what endures in beings; namely the relation 
to their ground. Heidegger’s argument coheres, though some questions arise 
(which are outside the scope of this paper), as noted earlier, about the ‘essence’ 
as well as the questioning that it “calls” from us (as Heidegger would have it). 
So, ‘truth’ in this context is not a matter of observing or discovering 
empirically or in materialist terms, the ‘nature’ of things. It is, rather, in 
Heidegger’s words, “the innermost accomplishment of liberation”,23 that is, not 
of human beings but of the relation that pertains between the thing and the 
ground, which Heidegger called a presencing in ‘us’. In this sense, ‘we’, who 
manifest confusion in our asking of the question concerning the ‘nature’ of a 
thing or the ‘nature’ of things, and who at the same time ‘shatter’, to use 
                                                             
20 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, p. 56. 
21 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, p. 56. 
22 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1959), p. 114. 
23 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, p. 53. 
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Heidegger’s metaphor, the relation between the ground and that thing or those 
things whose ‘nature’ we seek to know, ‘awaken’, to use another of his 
metaphors, the question of the ‘essence’ which endures in us; which lies 
outside the sphere of the provable or unprovable; and which concerns the 
deconcealment of being as the ground in that very thing or those very things. It 
is through deconcealment, Heidegger argued, that what is enduring and relates 
things to their ground through presencing, is revealed. 
What, then, did Heidegger mean by ‘truth’? He did not believe that truth 
is a matter of propositions, or justified, or justifiable, beliefs. He believed that 
one stands, so to speak, ‘in truth’. This is a little ambiguous. But what 
Heidegger meant was this, and it needs to be put in somewhat poetic terms (in 
order to remain faithful to his writing and its meaning): those who orient 
themselves towards the ‘essence’, or towards that which endures in us, turn 
towards that unhiddenness (which he believed, anchors things in their ground), 
and find the event of deconcealment (which he believed is the manifestation of 
unhiddenness), are ‘in truth’. In his own words: “only if, and only in so far as, 
[they] hold [themselves] within the unhiddenness of beings” and comport 
themselves “to this unhiddenness” (which is anchored in the ground of Being) 
[do they] “find the ground” of [their] “Dasein in that event of deconcealment 
which constitutes the unhiddenness of beings”.24 
 
Estrangement, Freedom, and Fantasy 
In summary then, if Heidegger is correct with regard to estrangement, the 
privileging of scientific-materialist paradigms into the nature of things 
obscures, confuses, and shatters the relation to the fundamental question of the 
ground (and the related question of the ‘deconcealment’ in beings). ‘We’ 
become estranged from the question of the ground of being and from the 
ground of being itself; and the question of our relation to that ground becomes 
confused, uncertain, and obscure. What is an appropriate response to this kind 
of analysis? Well, it takes (at least) two forms in contemporary thought and 
culture. 
Heidegger and Tolkien, who were almost exact contemporaries, 
articulated related concerns and projects that pose interesting questions in 
terms of the upsurge of scientific materialist discourses concerning life, the 
world and being, and so on. Heidegger emphasised at least three kinds of 
estrangement (from the ground of Being, from the question of the ground and 
from the question of the essence of freedom) in an extended critique of a kind 
of understanding of the human in relation to the categories of what he called 
                                                             
24 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, p. 55. 
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the techno-scientific paradigm; in relation to the emergence of nihilism in 20th 
century culture; and in relation to an essential task, namely the overcoming 
(Uberwindung) of traditional, scientific-materialist ontologies. 
Tolkien, in the domain of fiction and in his commentaries, affirmed a 
“Secondary World” which, by contrast, highlights the sense in which one can 
go beyond the perception of science’s verities (though he did not make clear 
what he took those ‘verities’ to be); beyond the bounds of a ‘frame’ of 
dominant rationalism, for example, in search of ‘images’ that are not apparent 
within that ‘frame’ (or are thought not to be found or to belong there); and in 
which estrangement from kin, community, ground, ‘nature’, ‘world’, being and 
so on can be overcome on imaginative, figurative and symbolic planes within a 
genre such as fantasy. 
Just as Tolkien affirmed and articulated the “Secondary World” to 
highlight the extent to which freedom can be realised – one of that ‘World’s’ 
fundamental affirmations – so Heidegger affirmed the liberation that may 
follow from reflection on the originary; “we think toward the ground of 
everything”,25 so that the “truth that determines us and has perhaps long since 
become unrecognizable”, especially in the light of the upsurge of scientific-
materialist discourses, does not vanish from view.26 In further studies, one 
might look fruitfully at the meaning and significance of liberation and freedom 
in their work; at the connections between the kind of liberation that Tolkien 
found in ‘fantasy’ as it relates to ‘science’, materialism or a dominant 
rationalism, and the kind of liberation that Heidegger located in thinking that is 
attuned to the originary; to an orientation towards the “essence”; and to the 
event of deconcealment. Further and more detailed studies of the relationship 
between the critique (implicit as well as explicit) of dominant materialist views 
of life or the universe in Tolkien’s fantasies and reflections, and of Heidegger’s 
broad critique of the dominance of ‘techno-scientific’ thinking and its 
connection to nascent materialism and nihilism in contemporary thought and 
culture, would conceivably reap some significant rewards. 
 
Conclusion 
If these commentaries and reflections are sound, it is not too much to say that 
Heidegger’s works offer much of value in relation not just to an understanding 
of estrangement but also to “fantasy”. What is unthought and even 
uncomprehended, as Heidegger would have it,27 in the sciences, and more 
                                                             
25 Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 2. 
26 Heidegger, Basic Concepts, p. 17. 
27 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 59. 
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broadly in scientific-materialist discourses, can be opened up in philosophy or 
in poetics – in a destruktion of ontology or in a genre which opens up a 
reflective space of and for originary questions: of and for beings and their 
ground; of and for the things that endure in ‘us’ (if any); of and for “ground-
concepts” and the experience of freedom28; of and for “remaining within the 
transmission” of something primordial and affirming that “attunement”, 
whether in works of fiction or of ontology or philosophy; and of and for, in 
Heidegger’s words, “bearing witness to the dwelling in what is transmitted”.29 
In the works of Heidegger and Tolkien, by extension, the histories of 
being, and of beings, are not the histories of human being; in the works of both, 
humanity is drawn into these histories,30 and these narratives and accounts 
affirm various levels and kinds of deconcealment and unhiddenness, for 
example in the symbolic form of the “Secondary World” or in the form of 
originary, and somewhat poetized, thinking. Though there are, no doubt, many 
stories of confusion, obscurity, decline, and estrangement, we are brought back 
in the work of both to the experience of reflection, in the words of Heidegger, 
as a relation to being and to consequent possibilities of freedom on symbolic 
(metaphorical) and literal planes.31  
Heidegger believed that “no transformation comes without an 
anticipatory escort. But how does an escort draw near unless Appropriation 
opens out. Which, calling, needing, envisions human being, that is, sees and in 
that seeing brings mortals to the path of thinking, poetizing building”.32 It is 
possible to suggest that ‘fantasy’, on one level, attests to this kind of 
‘appropriation’, that is to say, to an opening for thinking that may well take us 
beyond what Tolkien regarded as the dominance of scientific-materialist 
thinking about life or the world. Their purpose(s), point(s) or pointlessness (in 
some sense) ‘brings mortals’ often, if not always, to questions, events, and 
experiences of an originary or primordial, ‘poetized’ kind; that is to say, in 
Heidegger’s terms, to a ‘clearing’ where paths of thinking (in ‘poetized 
structures’ or symbolic structures, for example) lead beyond human being and 
the question of ‘its’ ‘nature’, and beyond estrangement on numerous levels. 
                                                             
28 Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 76. 
29 Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 78. 
30 Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 82. 
31 Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 97. 
32 Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 110. 
